This paper estimates the effect on participation rates of families of various types of replacing HUD's largest low-income housing programs with alternative tenure-neutral entitlement housing voucher programs that differ in their taxpayer cost and the relative generosity of the subsidy to households of different types. The estimates of participation in the entitlement programs are based primarily on the five-percent household sample from the 2000 Decennial Census and participation experience in the only entitlement housing assistance programs that have been operated in the United States. HUD's administrative records provide data on current recipients of low-income housing assistance. The paper explores the sensitivity of the results to the equations used to predict participation. The results indicate that even the entitlement housing voucher program that costs 10 percent less than the current system would serve 50 percent more households in total and many more of each type -white, black, and Hispanic; elderly and nonelderly; families living in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas; small, medium, and large families; and households in the first two real income deciles.
Introduction
Low-income housing assistance is a major part of the U.S. welfare system. Unlike other major means-tested transfer programs, no low-income housing program is an entitlement for any type of household. Nevertheless, federal, state, and local governments spend substantially more on housing subsidies to the poor than on other better-known parts of the welfare system such as TANF. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development spent more than $36 billion in FY 2009, federal tax expenditures on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, mortgage revenue bonds, and multi-family revenue bonds added more than $5 billion, the USDA's low-income housing programs cost almost $1 billion, and state and local governments spend some money from their own resources to provide such assistance. For example, local governments provide substantial property tax abatements to all public housing projects and many privately owned projects.
Plausible assumptions about taxpayer preferences argue strongly for replacing the current patchwork of non-entitlement low-income housing programs with an entitlement housing assistance program for the poorest households [Olsen, 2003, pp. 428-430] . The non-entitlement nature of housing assistance is a historical accident. 1 1 Government involvement began during the Great Depression with a program that subsidized the construction of public housing projects. In part, this program was intended to increase employment. The number of households made eligible for public housing enormously exceeded the ability to build apartments for them.
Offering some households large subsidies while denying assistance to other identical households cannot be defended. Evidence on the excessive costs of all forms of unit-based housing assistance argues for exclusive reliance on tenant-based assistance [Olsen, 2003, pp. 394-399; Olsen, 2008, pp. 9-15; Olsen, 2009] . It costs much more to provide equally good housing with unit-based housing assistance, and unit-based assistance has no offsetting advantages. Therefore, it would be possible to serve current recipients equally well (that is, provide them with equally good housing for the same rent) and serve many additional families without spending more money by shifting resources from unitbased to tenant-based assistance. The results of the best study of HUD's largest program that subsidized the construction of privately-owned projects imply that tenant-based vouchers could have provided all of the families who participated in the Section 8 New Construction Program with equally good housing for the same rent and served at least 72 percent more families with similar characteristics equally well without any additional public expenditure [Wallace et al., 1981] . Finally, few argue that the government should actively discourage homeownership by low-income households. Low-income housing assistance should be at worst neutral in this regard. Recent events say more about how, rather than whether, to deliver homeownership assistance to low-income households.
The current situation differs greatly from the ideal of an entitlement program of tenantbased housing assistance that does not discourage homeownership. Less than 30 percent of eligible renters receive low-income housing assistance, and this percentage is much lower for eligible homeowners [Olsen, 2003, pp. 390-393] . This is not because they do not want it on the terms offered. There are long waiting lists to get into subsidized housing in all localities, and the length of the waiting list understates excess demand in many localities because housing authorities often close their waiting lists when they get sufficiently long. Furthermore, more than two thirds of low-income housing assistance is unit-based. Finally, the current system of lowincome housing assistance is heavily biased against homeownership. After accounting for geographical price differences and adding an imputed return on home equity to the income of homeowners in calculating real income, nearly 25 percent of renters but less than 5 percent of homeowners in the lowest real income decile receive housing assistance. The gap is smaller in the second real income decile, but still substantial [Olsen, 2007, Table 1 ]. The federal government does provide large subsidies through the federal income tax system that induce more households to be homeowners and homeowners to occupy better housing. However, the bulk of these subsidies go to middle-and upper-income families.
Replacing the current system of low-income housing programs with an entitlement program of tenant-based assistance has been espoused by housing policy analysts for many years [Khadduri and Struyk (1982) , Olsen (1982) , Weicher (1997) , and Olsen (2004) ]. The Clinton Administration proposed comprehensive legislation for phasing out unit-based assistance [HUD, 1995] , and in his campaign against President Clinton, Robert Dole also proposed vouchering out public housing. Although the Clinton proposals were not adopted, the 1998 Housing Act mandated the demolition of public housing projects and the provision of tenant-based assistance to their residents under certain circumstances and allowed it under other circumstances. This paper studies the effect on participation rates of families of various types of replacing HUD's current low-income housing programs with alternative tenure-neutral entitlement housing voucher programs. Some have the same taxpayer cost as the current system, others cost 10 percent more, and still others 10 percent less. Several alternative adjustments of the subsidy for family size and composition are considered as well as higher subsidies for households with an elderly or disabled head. Finally, the paper explores the sensitivity of the results to the equations used to predict participation.
The entitlement voucher programs analyzed would offer a cash grant to each eligible family on the condition that it occupy housing meeting certain standards. This type of housing voucher was used in HUD's entitlement Housing Assistance Supply Experiment (HASE) operated in two metropolitan areas in the 1970s and in a non-entitlement national voucher program administered by HUD from 1983 through 1999. The minimum housing standards are similar to those in HUD's current voucher program. Like most current HUD programs, the entitlement voucher programs considered reduce the subsidy by 30 cents for each additional dollar of adjusted income. They also mimic the income adjustments in current programs. Unlike the current voucher program, the proposed programs are neutral with respect to homeownership (that is, a household receives the same subsidy with the same restrictions whether it owns or rents its dwelling unit). They also involve different subsidy levels than the current voucher program in order to achieve specified taxpayer costs.
Due to the absence of relevant data on the characteristics of households served by the majority of occupants of Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects, USDA's housing programs, HUD's HOME and CDBG block grants, and HUD's programs for the homeless, the analysis will be limited to replacing HUD's other programs with an entitlement voucher program. That is, this paper analyzes effects of replacing public housing, the tenant-based and project-based Section 8 programs, and HUD's older programs that subsidize privately owned projects. Since HUD provides project-based or tenant-based Section 8 subsidies on behalf of a substantial minority of the tenants of tax credit projects and HUD routinely collects data on these households, they are included in the analysis. The overwhelming majority of other households in tax credit projects have incomes too high to be eligible for the entitlement programs analyzed.
We assume that these households and households served by other programs excluded from the analysis will continue to be served by their current programs. Since the proposed reforms would not reduce the development subsidies associated with tax credit projects, these projects would continue to serve the same number of households. As in HASE, voucher recipients would not be allowed to live in subsidized housing projects. Therefore, the poorest households in tax credit projects would be replaced gradually by households with higher incomes.
The estimates of participation in the entitlement housing voucher programs are based on the five-percent household sample from the 2000 Decennial Census and previously estimated regression equations explaining participation in the entitlement housing assistance programs operated during the 1970s in two metropolitan areas as a part of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program's Housing Assistance Supply Experiment. These two experimental programs are the only entitlement low-income housing programs that have been operated in the United States. The two sites were chosen to differ greatly with respect to their vacancy rate and racial composition. The Supply Experiment entitlement housing assistance programs were neutral with respect to homeownership, and they provided a subsidy equal to a payment standard minus 25 percent of adjusted income on the condition that the household occupy a dwelling meeting certain minimum housing standards. To predict participation rates based on HASE experience, we adjust 1999 nominal magnitudes for differences in prices across space and time.
HUD administrative data are used to determine participation rates of different types of households under its current programs.
In assessing the political feasibility of the type of fundamental reform considered in this paper, it is important to realize that this reform need not be implemented overnight. A politically feasible reform would involve a transition that does not harm, or even benefits, the overwhelming majority of current recipients of low-income housing assistance. For example, public housing tenants could be offered a choice between housing vouchers and staying in their current units on the same terms. This will benefit some without hurting others. Current recipients of Section 8 vouchers could be allowed to receive the generous subsidies that are now offered by the program while new recipients receive less generous subsidies so that more households can be served. Reform must also honor legal commitments. For example, payments on current terms will be provided to owners of private subsidized projects until the end of their use agreements. Occupants of these projects will not be offered vouchers until that time, and they might be provided with a moving allowance if they decide to move at the end of the use agreement. 
Entitlement Housing Voucher Programs
This section specifies the parameters common to the entitlement housing voucher programs analyzed. Because these programs have the same structure and some of the same parameters as the program operated in HASE and participation predictions are based on HASE experience, we begin with a few additional details about the Experiment. [Lowry, 1983, p. 90] . In the entitlement voucher programs considered in this paper, the fraction eligible ranges from 14.5 to 16.3 percent. Unlike established housing programs, both renters and homeowners could participate. These households were offered a cash grant on the condition that they occupy housing meeting certain standards. These payments could continue for up to ten years provided that the household's income remained sufficiently low. Unlike the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, the payments were made directly to the households. Empirical evidence indicates that the costeffectiveness of the voucher program does not depend to any significant extent on this feature [Mayo et al. (1980) ; Wallace et al., 1981; Weinberg, 1982; Leger and Kennedy, 1990 4 This subsidy formula differs from that in the current voucher program in several respects. Under the proposed programs, the subsidy does not depend on the rent of the unit occupied. Under the current voucher program, occupying a unit renting for less than the program's payment standard reduces the subsidy dollar for dollar and (on new leases) occupying one renting for more than the payment standard plus 10 percent of adjusted income reduces the subsidy to zero [Olsen, 2003, pp. 401-404] .
Like other welfare programs, we set a lower bound on the subsidy to avoid the administrative cost of distributing a small amount of money. Table 1 reports the ratio of our payment standard for units with each number of bedrooms to our two-bedroom payment standard.
6
The adjusted income used to determine a household's subsidy is the household's cash income from all sources plus an estimated return on home equity for homeowners minus allowed deductions from income, unless this yields a negative number. In this case, adjusted income is zero. Because homeowners are richer than renters with the same ordinary income, we add an estimated return on their home equity to their ordinary income to determine their gross incomes, as was done in HASE [Katagiri and Kingsley, 1980, 2.03(3) ]. Appendix A describes how we calculated the estimated return for each homeowner. Our allowed deductions from gross income mimic those in the HUD programs replaced at the time of our data to the extent possible with the Decennial Census's PUMS data, namely, $480 a year per child, $400 a year if the head or cohead of the household was elderly or disabled, and the mean of other deductions ($628 a year) based on HUD's administrative data. Unlike many welfare programs, the allowed deductions Using these housing price indices and the nationally uniform bedroom adjustment factors, the payment standards for all numbers of bedrooms and all locations can be computed from the two-bedroom payment standard in any location.
from gross income in low-income housing programs are modest. Their nominal amounts have not been changed for many years.
Methodology for Predicting Participation in Entitlement Programs
The purposes of this paper are to estimate participation rates under alternative entitlement housing voucher programs and compare them with participation patterns in HUD's current programs that they are intended to replace. In order to estimate the number of households that would participate in a particular entitlement housing voucher program and its cost, it is necessary to predict the participation rate of households with each combination of observed characteristics.
This section discusses the alternative methods that could have been used to make these predictions and describes the method chosen in more detail.
There are two possible approaches to the prediction of participation rates under an entitlement housing voucher program. One possibility is to use information on outcomes under the current non-entitlement system of housing assistance to estimate a model that could be used to simulate the effects of replacing this system with an entitlement housing voucher program.
The other approach is to base predictions of participation rates under the proposed program on outcomes under a previous entitlement housing voucher program.
Implementing the first approach would be very difficult. It would involve specifying and estimating a model that explains the choices of a random sample of households under the current non-entitlement system of housing assistance. This requires data on which households were offered housing assistance, how this offer affected the consumption bundles available to the household, and which households accepted the offer. No survey of a random sample of the population collects information about which unassisted families were offered housing assistance.
Without information on which families were offered housing assistance and what they were offered, it is not possible to describe accurately their budget spaces when they made their decisions. Since the overwhelming majority of unassisted households are not offered housing assistance during a year, the best approximation of reality is to assume that no unassisted household was offered it. This will lead to biased estimators of the parameters of the model.
To avoid the preceding difficulties, we opted for the second approach. We estimate the participation rates of households of various types in the five-percent household sample from the 2000 Decennial Census using a previously estimated logit equation explaining participation in the Housing Assistance Supply Experiment. This equation reported in Table 2 Most of our predictions are based on the mean predicted participation rates across the two sites. However, to test the sensitivity of the results to the prediction equation used, we also produce results based on the equations for the individual sites. At the sample mean values of the variables, the predicted probability of participation is 10 percentage points lower in South Bend than Green Bay.
Therefore, these prediction equations provide a substantial difference in predicted participation rates.
The logit equation contains two variables Duration of Eligibility and Fraction Previous
Year Eligible that are not available in the PUMS. We substituted HASE sample mean values of these variables into the prediction equation. The logit equation also contained a dummy variable
Previous Interview whose value we set equal to zero for the reason mentioned below. Each year during HASE, the occupants of a random sample of dwelling units chosen at the outset of the experiment were surveyed. the respondent had been interviewed previously and 0 otherwise. Unsurprisingly, it was found that respondents who had been interviewed previously were more likely to be receiving a housing allowance. Because no similar survey will accompany our reforms, we set the value of this variable equal to zero.
9 Table 3 reports the percentage of the U.S. population in broad racial and ethnic groups in 2000 and the percentages in HASE sites in 1980. It documents the substantial difference in the racial composition of the two HASE sites that reflected a conscious choice in site selection.
More importantly for present purposes, it reveals the very small Hispanic population in the two sites compared with their percentage of the U.S. population in 2000. The households classified as minority in the sample underlying the logit equation were overwhelmingly black. Very few were Hispanic.
However, a careful consideration of the racial and ethnic mixes of the populations in HASE sites in 1977 and the participation rates of these groups in low-income housing programs in 1999 argues strongly for a more nuanced approach.
Clearly, HASE logit equations are most informative about the participation rates of nonHispanic whites and blacks, and we use them without modification for these groups. NonHispanic whites and blacks accounted for about 82 percent of HUD-assisted households in the lowest two real income deciles in 1999.
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Our decisions about how to predict participation rates of households with other combinations of race and ethnicity are based on evidence on participation in HUD's nonentitlement housing voucher program in 1999 by households in the first real income decile.
About two thirds of participants in the proposed programs are in this decile. Because the existing program was a non-entitlement program that allocated funds to different localities in proportions that surely differed from the expenditure proportions under our entitlement programs, and the current program did not affect the consumption possibilities of households offered assistance in exactly the same way as any entitlement housing voucher program analyzed, the relative participation rates of different groups will not be exactly the same under the existing and proposed programs. Nevertheless, we believe that the relative participation rates of different groups in the current voucher program provide useful guidance for predicting the participation rates of groups other than non-Hispanic whites and blacks. In our view, this is undeniable for other-race Hispanics.
Since almost all households eligible for the entitlement housing programs are in these income deciles, the logit equation provides a good basis for predicting participation for the bulk of likely participants. 10 Our method for calculating real income is described later. Briefly, it accounts for geographic differences in consumer prices and differences in family size and composition
The most striking result in Table 4 Unlike the proposed entitlement programs, HASE did not replace the low-income housing programs that existed at the time. Instead it offered an alternative form of housing assistance to all households with sufficiently low income, roughly the poorest 15 to 20 percent of households. Most families served by existing programs were eligible for HASE, but few switched to the allowance program [Lowry, 1983, p. 89] .
Categorizing other-race Hispanics as minorities in the logit equation for predicting their participation in an entitlement housing voucher program with current citizenship rules for eligibility would grossly overstate their participation. Based on the numbers in Table 4 Overall, the preceding analysis led us to conclude that the LODI file contained about 87 percent of HUD-assisted households, and we adjusted total participation in current programs upward by that magnitude. However, we did not adjust participation rates upwards by the same percentage for families of all types. We used the same percentage adjustment for all families in the same state, but families of a given type accounted for different fractions of the population in different states.
Since there were about 70,000 households served by IHA and 110,000
HUD-assisted households in U.S. possessions, the comparable HUD number is also about 4.15 million. This does not preclude errors in a particular direction for some types of households, but it implies errors of equal magnitude in the opposite direction for other types.
Taxpayer Cost of Existing Housing Programs
The purpose of this paper is to estimate certain effects of replacing the bulk of HUD's lowincome housing programs for most potential recipients in the United States with alternative entitlement housing voucher programs with the same taxpayer cost as the current system and with taxpayer costs 10 percent more and less than this amount. This section describes how we estimated the cost of serving all households except single non-elderly under the HUD programs replaced.
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The HUD programs that would be replaced with the entitlement voucher program served about 4.0 million households in 1999. The full taxpayer cost of serving these households is not
For the reasons mentioned below, ours is a conservative estimate of taxpayer cost.
As a result, our estimate of the increase in the number of households served that would result from the reform is understated on this account.
available. To get a lower bound estimate of this cost, we begin with the reported outlays of the HUD programs that served them. According to the U.S. House of Representatives (2000 , Table   15 -32), this amount was about $25 billion. However, a part of it was used to serve non-elderly one-person households that are excluded from the analysis. In adjusting the total taxpayer cost for the exclusion of these households, we account for their share of total assisted households (about 20 percent) and the ratio of their cost per household to the cost per household of other household types. In the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, the latter ratio is about .77. 20 Since we have not found data for other programs, we assume that this ratio applies to all current HUD programs. This leads to the conclusions that the excluded households account for 16.7 percent of the aforementioned budget and hence about $20.8 billion is spent on the households included in the analysis. This figure includes almost $500 million spent to assist households in U.S. possessions, mainly Puerto Rico.
21
The taxpayer cost of providing housing assistance to the specified households is clearly much greater than this amount. For example, about 40 percent of the households that live in tax credit projects receive tenant-based or project-based Section 8 assistance [GAO, 1997, p. 40] .
HUD assistance under these programs is included in our total. However, the tax credit subsidy that pays 70 percent of the development cost is not included. Furthermore, tax credit projects usually receive additional subsidies from several other sources that are not included in the outlays of the specified HUD programs. For example, many receive subsidies funded by the HOME Program that provides housing block grants to state and local governments [Cummings and DiPasquale, 1999, p. 299] . Public housing provides another example. Housing authorities receive substantial property tax abatements on their projects. This is a cost to local taxpayers. A less obvious example is the opportunity cost of continuing to use public housing projects to serve assisted households. These projects could be sold to the highest bidders and the proceeds put into a trust fund whose interest is used to fund housing vouchers. Since some of these funds
Assuming that 16.7 percent is devoted to single non-elderly, about $400 million is devoted to other households. This suggests that the total taxpayer cost of the programs replaced in the United States for serving all households except the single non-elderly was about $20.4 billion.
would be difficult to tap to support an entitlement housing voucher program, we ignore these costs and limit our budget for most proposed entitlement programs to $20.4 billion.
Because the entitlement voucher programs would have administrative costs, the entire $20.4 billion would not be available to distribute to recipients. We assume that the administrative cost of the entitlement programs would account for the same fraction of the total cost as in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, namely, 8.2 percent. 22 This leaves $18.8 billion to distribute to recipients. All of our simulations involving equal taxpayer cost distribute slightly less than this amount. HASE administered their entitlement program in a simpler manner than the current voucher program. If these procedures were used, it would be possible to distribute more to recipients with no increase in the budget.
Results
This section presents estimates of the effect on participation rates of families of various types of replacing HUD's largest current low-income housing with alternative tenure-neutral entitlement housing voucher programs. Most simulations are designed to have the same taxpayer cost as the current system, but one is designed to spend 10 percent more and another 10 percent less. Most simulations adjust the payment standards for differences in the number of bedrooms to which the family is entitled in a manner consistent with the national average in HUD's Section 8 Housing
Choice Voucher Program, but one uses adjustments based on a hedonic regression. Most predict participation in the entitlement program as the mean of the predicted probabilities from the two HASE sites for families of each type. However, to test the sensitivity of the results to the prediction equation used, we calculate separate results based on the prediction equations for each site. We report results for families whose members are in the first and second decile of the distribution of real income. This requires a measure of the real income of the members of a household. In all simulations, we add an imputed return on home equity to the income of homeowners and account for geographical price differences in calculating real household income. To measure the level of material well-being attained by the individuals in the household in most simulations, we divide real household income by an equivalence scale for family size 22 In fiscal year 2005, HUD spent $13.5 billion on housing assistance payments and $1.2 billion on program administration (http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2115).
and composition recommended by a committee of the National Research Council, namely, the number of adults plus .7 times the number of children all raised to the .7 power, [Citro and Michael, 1995, p. 162] . In one simulation, we use the simpler real household per capita income. Table 5 reports results based on the current budget for the programs replaced, payment standard adjustments for the number of bedrooms in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher
Program, the mean of the predicted probabilities from the two HASE sites, and the NRC equivalence scale for family size and composition. It indicates that the entitlement housing voucher program would serve more than 2 million additional households with a slightly smaller budget, namely, $20.0 rather than $20.4 billion. All major groups would experience large increases in participation from the reform ranging from 16 percent for black households to 155 percent for households with 5 or more members.
In interpreting the results in this table, it is important to distinguish between the amount of money spent on behalf of a recipient and how much the recipient is helped. Because the same total amount is spent on a larger number of households, the amount spent per household is less under the entitlement housing voucher program than with the continuation of the current system. Current recipients will not be hurt by the reforms because they will be grandfathered. However, many future recipients will receive smaller subsidies than they would have received with the continuation of the current system. This does not mean that they will be served less well. The best previous studies show that housing vouchers could be used to provide occupants of subsidized housing projects with equally good housing for the same rent at a much lower taxpayer cost [Mayo et al. (1980) ; Wallace et al., 1981] . More recent studies yield the same conclusion, albeit based on data of lower quality. The amount spent on behalf of recipients under different types of low-income housing assistance is a poor measure of how much they are helped by it. The 61 percent increase in the number of households served due to the reform analyzed in Table 5 results to a considerable extent from replacing programs of project-based assistance with much more cost-effective housing vouchers. However, it is the case that households that would have received Section 8 vouchers with a continuation of the current system would not only receive smaller subsidies but also be less well served by the entitlement housing voucher program. The entitlement program's payment standards were less than HUD's FMRs in almost all cases. The median and mean payment standards for two-bedroom units across all metropolitan areas were about 16 percent less than the median and mean FMRs. In our view, this reduction in subsidies to future recipients serves the interest of equity. Instead of providing larger subsidies to two identical households and none to a third, the proposed reform provides smaller subsidies to all three. Table 6 shows that the wide range of percentage increases for different groups is due to the overrepresentation of some groups and underrepresentation of others in the current system. It reports participation rates in the current system and under the entitlement voucher program separately for households in the first and second real income deciles. About 93 percent of current recipients and 98 percent of participants in the entitlement voucher are in these real income deciles. Under the current system, the participation rate of blacks in the first income decile is more than twice the participation rate of whites or Hispanics. Under the entitlement voucher program, the black participation rate is only slightly greater than the white rate.
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Since the proposed reforms would require congressional approval and members represent states or parts of states, we report the overall results for each state. Table 7 indicates very large increases in the overwhelming majority of states. In five states, more than twice as many households would be served. Only five states would experience decreases in the number of assisted households. These range from 0.2 percent in Connecticut to 11 percent in North Dakota.
These are small states that had unusually high participation rates under the current system ranging from 23.9 percent in the bottom two real income deciles in South Dakota to 44.9 percent in D.C. Throughout the country, only 17.8 percent of all households in these deciles participated in the current programs.
Because blacks in the lowest real income decile participate at such a high rate in the current system, they would experience a smaller increase in participation than other groups due to the reform (about 13 percent). The pattern is similar in the second real income decile. The data in Table 6 support the conventional wisdom that current low-income housing programs serve large families at a much lower rate than smaller families. Large families would be served at a much higher rate under the entitlement voucher program and hence experience the greatest percentage increase in participation from the reform.
Although passage of legislation to implement reforms does not require unanimous consent, it would surely be facilitated by insuring that no state experiences a reduction in the 23 The Hispanic participation rate is much lower than the rates for blacks and whites due to the very low predicted participation rates of other-race Hispanics due to their immigration status.
number of households that receive housing assistance. Because the states involved have such small populations, this can be done at a minute cost by providing higher subsidies to the households in these states than would result from the strict application of the formulas underlying the proposed entitlement housing voucher program. This is a common legislative practice. One particularly relevant example is the legislation that allows selected housing authorities to base their payment standards in HUD's Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher
Program on Fair Market Rents that are 25 percent greater than the norm. This enables them to provide more generous subsidies to the residents of their areas at the expense of taxpayers elsewhere. Allowing housing authorities in the five states that would experience declines in the number of assisted households under the standard formulas of the proposed reform to offer sufficiently generous subsidies so that the number of assisted households in each state would increase by 5 percent would cost less than $76 million each year. This would increase the cost of the proposed reform to $20.1 billion which is still less than the cost of the current system. Table 8 reports results for alternative policy parameters, participation prediction equations, taxpayer cost, and measures of real income. Column 1 repeats the results for the simulation reported in Table 5 . The results of each alternative simulation are compared with them.
The results in column 2 are based on the same assumptions as those in column 1 except for the measure of real income. In column 2, the real income enjoyed by members of a household is simply real household income accounting for geographic price differences and the return on home equity for homeowners divided by the number of members of the household.
This alternative definition of real income only affects the estimated percentage increase for households in different real income deciles. Although alternative definitions of real income lead to different quantitative conclusions about the increases in the two lowest deciles, the qualitative effects are the same. Households in both deciles would experience large increases in participation due to the reforms.
The results of an entitlement housing voucher program depend on its parameters. For example, the participation rate of larger households relative to smaller households can be increased without spending more money by increasing the payment standards associated with units with many bedrooms and reducing it for units with few bedrooms. Column 3 reports the results of an alternative variation in program parameters, namely, 10 percent higher payment standards for households with an elderly or disabled household head. Some argue an increment is desirable to pay for additional features that are important for these households. This modification of program parameters has some effect on the participation rates of all groups, but its largest effects are to increase the participation rates of the elderly, small households, and households in the second real income decile.
Column 4 reports results for an alternative set of payment standards. Specifically, payment standards for units with different numbers of bedrooms are based on a hedonic regression rather than HUD's Fair Market Rents (see table 1 ). These lead to differences in the payment standards and hence subsidies for households of different sizes and compositions. For most groups, the effect is modest. Although the smallest households gain the most from these alternative payment standards, their percentage gain in participation from replacing current programs with an entitlement voucher program is still much smaller than for larger households.
Some favor greater spending on low-income housing assistance; others favor less spending for this purpose. Columns 5 and 6 report the results of spending about 10 percent more and 10 percent less than the current system, respectively. The most important result is that the proposed reform would serve 50 percent more households in total and substantially more households of every type while spending 10 percent less money.
The preceding estimates of the effects of proposed reforms are based on the average participation experience in the two HASE sites. The actual effects will surely be at least somewhat different because the actual participation rates of households with a particular set of characteristics and offered a particular subsidy will differ from the average HASE experience.
The remaining columns in Table 8 indicate the sensitivity of our results to the equation used to predict participation. As mentioned earlier, the two HASE sites differed greatly in their vacancy rates and racial composition and experienced very different participation rates in the entitlement program for households with the same characteristics. At the sample mean values of the variables, the predicted probability of participation based on the logit equation is 10 percentage points lower in South Bend than Green Bay. Therefore, these prediction equations provide a substantial difference in predicted participation rates. for all groups and spending $1.5 billion less. Column 10 reports the outcomes for the same voucher program based on the Green Bay participation experience. In this case, the increases would be larger for all groups and the cost would be $1.6 billion more.
It is rarely, if ever, possible to predict exactly the cost of changes in government policy, and the inability to do it in this case is a very weak argument against the proposed reform because it will be phased in over about a decade. If participation experience deviates from the expected in the early years, the payment standards can be adjusted to account for these deviations. Some adjustments in payment standards will occur every year to account for inflation. In the early years of the reform, this could be done each year rather than by formula.
If participation rates and hence taxpayer cost are higher than expected, these adjustments could be more modest. If they are lower than expected, the adjustments could be more generous.
Conclusion
The calculations in this paper strongly suggest that it will be possible to devise an entitlement housing voucher program that costs no more than the current system and that serves many more households of each type. Indeed, an entitlement voucher program that costs much less than the current system would have this effect. With due attention to the transition to the new system, this can be done without hurting current recipients. Indeed, a transition can be designed to benefit many of these households. Our conclusion is that replacing the current system with an entitlement housing allowance program serves the interests of low-income households and the taxpayers who want to help them with their housing. Sometimes it is possible to get more for less.
Appendix A
This appendix describes how we calculated the return on home equity of each homeowner in the 2000 Decennial Census PUMS. Home equity is equal to the market value of the house minus the outstanding balance on all home loans. The PUMS reports the owner's estimate of market value but does not report the outstanding balance on home loans. We combine information from the PUMS, the American Housing Survey, Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey, and research on the relationship between the owner's estimate of market value and actual sales price to approximate each household's home equity and the return on it.
PUMS reports the owner's estimate of market value (VALUE) in 24 categories. We use the midpoint of the category reported by a household as its estimate of the market value of its house. Based on research on the relationship between the owner's estimate of market value and actual sales price [Kiel and Zabel, 1999] , we multiply the owner's estimate by .95 to get a better estimate of market value.
PUMS does not report outstanding balances on mortgage and home equity loans.
However, it does report monthly payments on first and second mortgages (MRT1AMT and MRT2AMT) and the year that the household occupied the unit (YRMOVED). To approximate the outstanding balance, we assumed that (1) the owner's only loans are first and second mortgages taken out at the time that the household moved into its house, (2) the loans have not been refinanced, (3) both loans are for some standard duration, and (4) the interest rate on these loans is the national average interest rate for loans of similar durations at the time that the mortgage was originated. Under these assumptions, the appropriate formula to calculate outstanding balance on each mortgage is:
In this formula, OB is the outstanding balance on the loan, MP is the monthly payment (MRT1AMT or MRT2AMT), T is the number of remaining monthly payments, and r is the monthly interest rate. Adding the estimated outstanding balances on the first and second mortgages yields the overall outstanding balance. Due to the various approximations involved in our calculations, the predicted number of remaining mortgage payments was negative in some cases. In these cases, we assumed that the outstanding balance on the mortgage was zero. In part for the same reason, the estimated outstanding balance on all mortgages exceeded the estimate market value of the house in some cases. In these cases, we assumed that home equity was zero.
The PUMS does not report the exact date that the household moved into its house.
Instead, it reports the date in one of six categories: 1999-2000, 1995-1998, 1990-1994, 1980-1989, 1970-1978, and 1969 or earlier. We assume that the move occurred in the middle of each period except for the last. We assume that households in the last category moved into their house in January 1969. Very few people in this category had a mortgage. The first period was assumed to end on April 1, 2000, the approximate time of the census survey. Our calculations use the interest rates on 30-year and 15-year mortgages at these times for first and second mortgages, respectively. The PUMS data together with the preceding assumptions about when mortgages were originated leads to an estimate of the number of mortgage payments that had already been made. This combined with our assumption about the duration of first and second mortgages leads to an estimate of number of remaining mortgage payments.
Finally, we must apply a rate of return to home equity to get a dollar return that is added to the homeowner's income. Such returns differ from property to property and time to time. For our calculations, we assume a rate of return of 7.2 percent. This was the average mortgage interest rate on 30-year fixed rate mortgages between 1998 and 2002. The assumed rate of return overstates the average return on home equity for at least one important reason and understates it for another. Since the return on home equity is untaxed, the relevant rate of return is the expected after-tax return on a taxed investment of the same risk. Recipients of mortgage interest payments must pay taxes on this income. Therefore, the after-tax return on mortgages was less than 7.2 percent during this period. An offsetting bias is that mortgagors assume more risk than mortgagees. Mortgagees do not incur losses unless the market value of the house falls below the outstanding balance of the loan. Index funds based on the S&P 500 and the Wilshire 4500
arguably are more risky than mortgages but less risky than equity in a house. The returns on both indices vary greatly from year to year. Between 1996 and 2005, the return on the S&P index fund varied from a high of 33.17 percent in 1997 to a low of negative 22.05 percent in
2002. In 2000, the rates of return on these index funds were -9.14 and -9.74 percent, respectively. The before-tax rate of return on the stocks in the S&P 500 averaged about 9.01 percent over this period and the rate of return on the stocks in the Wilshire 4500 averaged about 9.75 percent. After-tax returns would be around 6 percent. The risk associated with the equity in a single asset is surely greater than the risk associated with an index fund of stocks. 
